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Abstract—We analyze and optimize the secrecy performance of
artificial noise (AN) in multi-input single-output wiretap channels
with multiple antennas at the transmitter and a single antenna at
the receiver and the eavesdropper. We consider two transmission
schemes: 1) an on-off transmission scheme with a constant secrecy
rate for all transmission periods, and 2) an adaptive transmission
scheme with a varying secrecy rate during each transmission
period. For the on-off transmission scheme, an easy-to-compute
expression is derived for the hybrid outage probability, which
allows us to evaluate the transmission outage probability and the
secrecy outage probability. For the adaptive transmission scheme
where transmission outage does not occur, we derive a closed-
form expression for the secrecy outage probability. Using these
expressions, we determine the optimal power allocation between
the information signal and the AN signal and also determine the
optimal secrecy rate such that the effective secrecy throughput
is maximized for both transmission schemes. We show that the
maximum effective secrecy throughput requires more power to
be allocated to the AN signal when the quality of the transmitter-
receiver channel or the transmitter-eavesdropper channel im-
proves. We also show that both transmission schemes achieve
a higher maximum effective secrecy throughput while incurring
a lower secrecy outage probability than existing schemes.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, multi-input single-output wire-
tap channels, optimization, physical-layer security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
RAPID and continuous growth of wireless mobile serviceshas opened up an emerging and promising research
focus in the design of wireless transmission strategies, in
the form of protecting the confidentiality and security of the
transmitted information. The need for this research focus arises
from the broadcast nature of the wireless medium that makes
wireless transmission vulnerable to potential eavesdropping.
To address this research focus, recent efforts have been devoted
to physical-layer security [1, 2], the core principle of which
is to exploit the characteristics of wireless channels in order
to guarantee secure communication between legitimate parties
[3–5]. By adding structured redundancy and randomness in
transmit signals, physical-layer security allows the legitimate
user to correctly decode confidential messages, but prevents
the eavesdroppers from successfully retrieving the messages.
Motivated by the benefits of physical-layer security, [6–9]
analyzed the secrecy performance of wiretap channels with a
single antenna at the transmitter, receiver, and eavesdropper(s).
The deployment of co-located multiple antennas at the
transmitter and/or the legitimate receiver has recently been
recognized as an effective means to enhance physical-layer
security. The effectiveness of multiple antennas lies in ex-
ploiting spatial degrees of freedom and thus increasing the
channel reliability between the transmitter and the receiver
while degrading the reception quality at the eavesdropper(s).
In early studies, e.g., [10–14], the secrecy capacity was an-
alyzed to realize the benefits of multiple antennas from an
information-theoretic perspective. An important assumption in
these theoretical studies is that the eavesdropper’s channel
state information (CSI) is available at the transmitter. Such
a strong assumption was relaxed in other recent papers which
concentrated on the design of signal processing algorithms
in multi-antenna wiretap channels. For example, [15] used
transmit beamforming (BF) in the direction of the legitimate
receiver to perform secure transmission. In order to reduce the
feedback and computational overheads caused by transmit BF,
[16–20] proposed transmit antenna selection and examined its
secrecy performance.
It is critical to note that transmit BF and transmit antenna
selection focus on enhancing the quality of the main channel
between the transmitter and the receiver only. In contrast to
those, [21] proposed a transmission scheme which transmits
artificial noise (AN) together with information signals to
deliberately interfere with the eavesdropper’s received signal.
Considering fast fading channels where the channel coherence
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time is smaller than the codeword period, [22–26] examined
the ergodic secrecy rate of the AN transmission scheme and
investigated the optimal power allocation for the maximization
of the secrecy rate. Considering slow fading channels where
the channel coherence time is larger than the codeword period,
[27–29] examined the secrecy outage probability of the AN
transmission scheme. More recently, [30, 31] investigated not
only the secrecy outage probability but the throughput of the
AN transmission scheme. Given a secrecy outage constraint,
[30] optimized the wiretap code rate in order to maximize
the average throughput of non-adaptive encoding (NAE) and
adaptive encoding (AE) schemes under the assumption of zero
noise at the eavesdropper. Different from [30], we considered
non-zero noise at the eavesdropper in [31] and determined the
optimal secrecy rate that maximizes the secrecy throughput.
In this paper, we analyze and optimize the effective secrecy
throughput (EST) of AN transmission schemes in multi-input
single-output (MISO) wiretap channels where the transmitter
is equipped with multiple antennas whereas the receiver is
equipped with a single antenna. We assume that a single-
antenna eavesdropper overhears the communication from the
transmitter to the receiver. In this work, we consider slow
fading and the scenario where the eavesdropper’s instanta-
neous CSI is not known at the transmitter. In this scenario,
the transmitter only uses the receiver’s instantaneous CSI
to design AN signals. We determine the optimal values of
two parameters: a) the power allocation between information
signals and AN signals, and b) the secrecy rate of wiretap
codes. These optimal parameters are determined so as to
maximize the EST of two AN transmission schemes: 1) an on-
off transmission scheme where the optimal power allocation
and the optimal secrecy rate are chosen independent of the
main channel realization across all transmission periods and
2) an adaptive transmission scheme where the optimal power
allocation and the optimal secrecy rate are chosen based on
the main channel realization for each transmission period.
Here, the EST1 is defined as the product of the secrecy
rate and the secure transmission probability [33]. Thus, the
analysis and optimization of the EST are practically significant
since they characterize the maximum average secrecy data
rate in secure communications. Notably, the optimization of
EST does not involve an a prior secrecy constraint that was
applied for all transmission blocks in [30]. In this work we
remove this constraint and quantify the maximum secrecy data
rate by allowing for different secrecy outage probabilities for
distinct transmission blocks. As such, our results are useful
for scenarios where a strict requirement on the secrecy outage
probability is not necessary.
In order to determine the optimal parameters of the two AN
transmission schemes, we derive an easy-to-compute expres-
sion for the hybrid outage probability given a secrecy rate for
the on-off transmission scheme. This expression characterizes
the probability that either transmission outage or secrecy
outage occurs. We also derive a closed-form expression for
the secrecy outage probability given a main channel realization
1The EST is different from the throughput in [30, 32] which was defined
as the product of the secrecy rate and the transmission probability and thus
examined the average rate at which the messages are transmitted.
and a secrecy rate for the adaptive transmission scheme. Based
on our newly derived expressions, we obtain the EST in closed
form and determine the joint optimal power allocation and
secrecy rate that maximizes the EST of both transmission
schemes. Notably, our optimal solutions are valid for general
operating scenarios with an arbitrary number of antennas at the
transmitter, an arbitrary average SNR at the receiver, and an
arbitrary average SNR at the eavesdropper. As such, our results
apply to the scenario where the eavesdropper is a regular
user and its average SNR is known at the transmitter. This is
different from [30], the results of which apply to the scenario
where the average SNR at the eavesdropper is unknown.
We offer valuable insights into the design of AN transmis-
sion built upon our analysis. For both schemes, we demonstrate
that the transmitter is required to allocate more power to the
AN signal to achieve the maximum EST when the number
of antennas at the transmitter increases, the average SNR
of the main channel increases, or the average SNR of the
eavesdropper’s channel increases. Moreover, we demonstrate
that the adaptive transmission scheme offers a higher EST
than the on-off transmission scheme, at the cost of increasing
signal processing complexity. Furthermore, we compare the
on-off and adaptive transmission schemes with the transmit
BF schemes [15] and the NAE and AE schemes [30]. We
also demonstrate that the on-off and adaptive transmission
schemes achieve a higher maximum EST than the NAE and
AE schemes [30] while maintaining a lower secrecy outage
probability2.
II. ARTIFICIAL NOISE IN MISO WIRETAP CHANNELS
A. MISO wiretap channels
We consider a MISO wiretap channel, as depicted in Fig. 1,
where the data transmission from an N -antenna transmitter
(Alice) to a single antenna legitimate receiver (Bob) is over-
heard by a single antenna eavesdropper (Eve). We denote the
main channel between Alice and Bob by an 1  N vector
h and denote the eavesdropper’s channel between Alice and
Eve by an 1  N vector g. We assume that the entries of h
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
unit variance, and the entries of g are i.i.d. zero-mean cir-
cularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
unit variance. We also assume that the noise components at
Bob and Eve are independent zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables that have unequal vari-
ances. As such, the average SNRs of the main channel and
eavesdropper’s channel may be different. We further assume
that the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel are
subject to slow block fading where the fading coefficients keep
invariant during the channel coherence time, and the channel
coherence time is larger than the codeword period.
2The higher maximum EST achieved by our schemes over the schemes
in [30] is due to the fact that we consider a different assumption from [30].
Due to the different assumption on the knowledge of the eavesdropper’s noise
level, no fair and direct comparison can be truly made between our results
and those of [30]. Rather, our work should be viewed as complimentary to
the work of [30].
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a multi-input single-output wiretap channel where
Alice is equipped with N antennas while Bob and Eve are equipped with a
single antenna each.
In this work, we consider the realistic scenario where
instantaneous information about g is not available to Alice.
We assume that Bob precisely estimates h and feeds it back
to Alice. Since the feedback from Bob to Alice is not secure,
we further assume that h is perfectly known at Eve. In order
to perform secure transmission, Alice encodes her messages
and transmits the resulting codewords to Bob. Eve passively
overhears the information conveyed from Alice to Bob without
causing any interference to the main channel.
In the MISO wiretap channel, the achievable secrecy rate
Cs is expressed as [14]
Cs =

Cb   Ce ; b > e
0 ; b  e; (1)
where Cb = log2 (1 + b) is the instantaneous capacity of the
main channel and Ce = log2 (1 + e) is the instantaneous
capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel. Here, b denotes
the instantaneous received SNR at Bob and e denotes the
instantaneous received SNR at Eve. Wiretap codes are adopted
at Alice in order to perform secure transmission to Bob such
that Alice needs to choose two rates of wiretap codes, namely,
the overall codeword rate, Rb, and the secrecy rate, Rs. The
difference between Rb and Rs, i.e., Rb   Rs, is the rate
redundancy that provides secrecy against eavesdropping. Since
we consider the passive eavesdropping scenario where the
instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel is not known
at Alice, Alice assumes the capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel as C 0e and designs the wiretap codes as Rb = Cb and
Rs = Cb C 0e. We note that perfect secrecy cannot be always
guaranteed in the passive eavesdropping scenario since there
exists a probability that some messages transmitted by Alice
are leaked to Eve.
B. Artificial noise
The signal transmitted by Alice is constructed in such a
manner that it contains both the information signal and the
AN signal, in order to secure the information signal from the
eavesdropper. We denote the transmitted signal vector by t,
the information signal by tIS, and the (N   1) 1 AN vector
by tAN. In order to perform this transmission, the N N BF
matrix is designed as [22]
W = [wIS WAN] ; (2)
where wIS is used to transmit tIS and WAN is used to transmit
tAN. Notably, the aim of W is to degrade the quality of the
received signals at Eve by transmitting AN in all directions
except towards Bob. As such, we choose wIS as the principal
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of hHh
[21], where hH denotes the complex conjugate transpose of h.
Here, wIS is normalized such that kwISk2 = 1. We then choose
WAN such that WAN is comprised of the remaining N   1
eigenvectors of hHh. As such, the columns WAN form an
orthonormal basis of the nullspace of h, i.e., hWAN = 0. Note
that W is a unitary matrix. Using W, the N  1 transmitted
signal vector at Alice is given by
t =W

tIS
tAN

= wIStIS +WANtAN: (3)
Therefore, the received signal at Bob is given by
y = ht+ nb = hwIStIS + hWANtAN + nb
= hwIStIS + nb; (4)
where nb is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob
satisfying E

nbn
H
b

= 2b ; E [] denotes the expectation.
During data transmission, we assume that the total transmit
power adopted at Alice is constrained by PT. We define the
overall transmit SNR of the main channel as b = PT=
2
b .
We also define the received SNR without AN at Bob as ~b =
bkhk2, where k  k denotes the Euclidean norm. The value of
~b can be obtained based on the feedback of khk2 from Bob.
We further define 2IS as the variance of tIS and 
2
AN as the
variance of each entry of tAN. Let the power allocation ratio ,
0 <   1, represent the fraction of the power allocated to tIS.
As such, we have 2IS = PT. Since Alice has no knowledge
about g, she equally distributes the transmit power to each
entry of tAN such that 2AN = (1  )PT= (N   1). We note
that the case of  = 1 is equivalent to transmit BF [15] where
Alice does not transmit AN but transmits information signals
using MRT with PT. Based on (4), we write the received SNR
with AN at Bob as
b =
PT
2b
khk2 = ~b: (5)
Given the transmitted signal vector in (3), the received
signal at Eve is given by
z = gt+ ne = gwIStIS + gWANtAN + ne; (6)
where ne is AWGN at Eve satisfying E

nen
H
e

= 2e . The
overall transmit SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel is defined
as e = PT=
2
e . We assume that b and e are publicly known
at Alice. This assumption that e is known at Alice applies
to the scenario where Eve is a regular user served by Alice
in previous time slots. That is, we assume Eve is part of a
multiuser system which in alternate time slots she becomes
an active legitimate participant in the system, and as such will
feedback to the transmitter her CSI and the estimated thermal
noise level for the time slot in which she is being served. From
this information, and under the assumption the eavesdropper is
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static (or moving slowly) the average SNR of Eve in the time
slots she is not being served can be derived. We note that
the assumption of available knowledge about e is adopted
in other physical-layer security studies, e.g., [8, 15, 17, 24, 28,
29]. It is important to point out that although Eve knows
the instantaneous knowledge of h, W, and g, she cannot
completely eliminate the interference caused by WANtAN. As
such, the instantaneous received signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) at Eve is written as
e =
PTkgwISk2
1 
N 1PTkgWANk2 + 2e
=
kgwISk2
1 
N 1kgWANk2 + 1e
: (7)
C. Statistics of b and e
We next derive the statistics of b and e in order to facilitate
our subsequent analysis. We find from (5) that b follows a
chi-squared distribution since khk2 is a sum of the squares
of N independent Gaussian random variables. As such, we
obtain the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of b as
Fb () = 1 
 

N; b

  (N)
= 1  e  b
N 1X
n=0
1
n!


b
n
;
(8)
where   (; ) is the upper incomplete gamma function [35,
Eq. (8.350.2)] and   () is the gamma function [35, Eq.
(8.310.1)]. In (8), the second equation holds by applying [35,
Eq. (8.351.2)] to expand  

N; b

.
We now derive the CDF of e. We note that the entries
of g are i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables
and W is a unitary matrix. Since the generation of W
is completely determined by the realization of h, as stated
in Section II-B, we conclude that W and g are mutually
independent. This leads to the outcome that gW has the same
distribution as g, i.e., the entries of gW are i.i.d. zero-mean
complex Gaussian random variables. The CDF of e is derived
as
Fe () = 1 

1 +
(1  ) 
 (N   1)
 (N 1)
e 

e : (9)
The detailed derivation of (9) can be found in [28, Appendix
A]. We highlight that (9) is valid for arbitrary values of e.
When e !1, we find that (9) simplifies to [30, Eq. (5)].
III. ON-OFF TRANSMISSION
In this section, we focus on the on-off transmission scheme
and examine its secrecy performance in the MISO wiretap
channel. We first introduce the principle of the general on-off
transmission scheme. We next derive closed-form expressions
for the transmission outage probability, the secrecy outage
probability, and the secure transmission probability. Based on
these expressions, we obtain the expressions for the EST, the
probability of non-zero secrecy rate, and the "-outage secrecy
rate. Utilizing these closed-form expressions, we first deter-
mine the optimal power allocation ratio  that minimizes the
hybrid outage probability for a given Rs, and then determine
the joint optimal pair (; Rs ) that maximizes the EST.
A. Principle of On-Off Transmission
In the general on-off transmission scheme, Alice selects a
predetermined power allocation ratio  and a predetermined
constant secrecy rate Rs for transmission. In this scheme,
Alice sets Rb = Cb and Rs = Cb   C 0e and determines
the values of  and Rs based on b and e. As such, the
values of  and Rs are fixed for all transmission periods and
independent of channel realizations. The optimal values of 
and Rs will be discussed in Section III-C. We next define
three mutually exclusive events which partition the entire event
space of this scheme.
Event 1: Transmission outage
This event occurs when Cb  Rs. In this case, we
find that wiretap codes cannot be constructed since
C 0e = Cb   Rs conflicts with C 0e > 0. As such, Rs
is not supported by the main channel and Alice does
not transmit.
Event 2: Secrecy outage
This event occurs when Cs < Rs and Cb > Rs.
In this case, we find that the assumed capacity of
the eavesdropper’s channel is lower than its actual
instantaneous value, i.e., C 0e < Ce. As such, Alice
transmits but secrecy is compromised.
Event 3: Secure transmission
This event occurs when Cs  Rs. In this case, we
find that the assumed capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel is better than the capacity of the eavesdrop-
per’s channel, i.e., C 0e  Ce. As such, Alice transmits
and the wiretap code guarantees perfect secrecy.
For these events, we examine four probabilities: i) the trans-
mission outage probability which is defined as the probability
of Event 1, ii) the secrecy outage probability which is defined
as the probability of Event 2, iii) the hybrid outage proba-
bility which is defined as the summation of the transmission
outage probability and the secrecy outage probability, and iv)
the secure transmission probability which is defined as the
probability of Event 3. We clarify that our on-off transmission
scheme is different from the NAE scheme of [30]. In the NAE
scheme the value of Rb is fixed, whereas in our scheme the
value of Rb is chosen dynamically as Rb = Cb. We quantify
later (Section V) the improvement in secrecy performance
achieved by dynamically setting Rb = Cb. We also clarify
that the secrecy outage probability we investigate in this work
is different from the conditional secrecy outage probability in
[30, Eq. (9)] which evaluates the probability of secrecy outage
conditioned on transmission.
B. Secrecy Performance of On-Off Transmission
1) Transmission outage probability: The transmission out-
age probability is defined as
Pto (;Rs) = Pr (Cb  Rs)
= Pr (log2 (1 + b)  Rs) : (10)
Based on the properties of b, we express the transmission
outage probability in terms of the CDF of b as
Pto (;Rs) = Fb
 
2Rs   1 : (11)
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Substituting (8) into (11), we obtain Pto (;Rs) as
Pto (;Rs) = 1  e 
2Rs 1
b
N 1X
n=0
1
n!

2Rs   1
b
n
: (12)
2) Secrecy outage probability: The secrecy outage proba-
bility is defined as
Pso (;Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs; Cb > Rs)
= Pr (Rs < Cb < Ce +Rs)
= Pr (Rs < log2 (1 + b) < log2 (1 + e) +Rs) : (13)
We next present our new result for the secrecy outage proba-
bility in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy outage probability for the on-off
transmission scheme is given by
Pso (;Rs) =
(
 P (1)s (;Rs) + Pt (;Rs) ; 0 <  < 1
 P (2)s (Rs) + Pt (;Rs) ;  = 1;
(14)
where
P (1)s (;Rs) =
1
e
e
  2RS 1b
N 1X
n=0
1
n! (b)
n
nX
m=0

n
m

 2mRS  2RS   1n m m+1  (m+ 1)
 [U (m+ 1; N +m+ 3; )
+ (1  ) eU (m+ 1; N +m+ 2; )] ; (15)
P (2)s (Rs) =
1
e
e
  2RS 1b
N 1X
n=0
1
n!nb
nX
m=0

n
m

 2mRS  2RS   1n m   (m+ 1)
2RS
b
+ 1e
m+1 ; (16)
and Pt (;Rs) = 1  Pto (;Rs). In (15), we use
 =
 (N   1)
1   ;  =

2RS
b
+
1
e

N   1
1   ;
and denote U (; ; ) as the Tricomi confluent hypergeometric
function [35, Eq. (9.211.4)].
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix A.
3) Hybrid outage probability and secure transmission prob-
ability: The hybrid outage probability is defined as
Pho (;Rs) = Pto (;Rs) + Pso (;Rs) : (17)
Substituting (12) and (14) into (17), we obtain Pho (;Rs) as
Pho (;Rs) =
(
1  P (1)s (;Rs) ; 0 <  < 1
1  P (2)s (Rs) ;  = 1:
(18)
The secure transmission probability is equal to the comple-
mentary probability of Pho (;Rs). Therefore, it is defined as
Pst (;Rs) = 1  Pho (;Rs) : (19)
Using (18), the secure transmission probability is obtained as
Pst (;Rs) =
(
P
(1)
s (;Rs) ; 0 <  < 1
P
(2)
s (Rs) ;  = 1:
(20)
We highlight that our new expressions in (18) and (20)
are easy to compute since they involve power functions,
exponential functions, and hypergeometric functions only. We
highlight that the values of these functions, including the
hypergeometric function, can be easily computed. Thus, the
optimal parameter and the optimal performance presented in
Section III-C can be easily obtained. Notably, the derived
results in (18) and (20) are valid for an arbitrary number of
transmit antennas and arbitrary average SNRs.
4) Effective secrecy throughput: We define the EST (in
bps/Hz) as the product of the secrecy rate, Rs, and the
secure transmission probability, Pst (;Rs). Mathematically,
it is expressed as
T (;Rs) = RsPst (;Rs) : (21)
As explained in Section I, such a performance metric evaluates
the average secrecy rate at which the messages are securely
transmitted from Alice to Bob without being eavesdropped on
by Eve [33]. Of course, it is impossible for Bob to identify
which messages are securely transmitted and which messages
are leaked in the passive eavesdropping scenario. However,
this performance metric is still meaningful since it quantifies
the average amount of the securely transmitted messages.
We note that Pst (;Rs) is a function of , N , b, and e.
As such, it is indicated from (21) that T (;Rs) is jointly
determined by  and Rs for given N , b, and e.
5) Other performance metrics: First, we focus on the
probability of non-zero secrecy rate which is defined as the
probability of b > e [8]. We formulate the probability of
non-zero secrecy rate as
Pnz = Pr (Cs > 0) = Pr (b > e)
= 1 
Z 1
0
Z e
0
fb (b) fe (e) dbde
= 1 
Z 1
0
fe (e)Fb (e) de: (22)
Comparing (22) with `1 in (43) in Appendix A, we observe
that Pnz can be obtained via Pnz = 1   Pho (;Rs) jRs=0.
Specifically, we obtain the probability of non-zero secrecy rate
as
Pnz =
(
P
(1)
nz () ; 0 <  < 1
P
(2)
nz ;  = 1;
(23)
where
P (1)nz () = P
(1)
s (; 0)
=
1
e
N 1X
n=0
!U (n+ 1; N + n+ 3; )
+
1  

N 1X
n=0
!U (n+ 1; N + n+ 2; ) (24)
with ! =  (n+1)
n+1
n!(b)
n and
P (2)nz = P
(2)
s (0)
=
1
e
N 1X
n=0
  (n+ 1)
n!nb

1
b
+
1
e
 (n+1)
: (25)
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Second, we examine the "-outage secrecy rate which is
defined as the highest secrecy rate Rs;max when the hybrid
outage probability is less than " [36]. We formulate the "-
outage secrecy rate as
C (; ") = max
Rs:Pho(;Rs)"
Rs: (26)
Substituting (18) into (26), the "-outage secrecy rate can be
obtained via numerical root-finding.
C. Performance Optimization of On-Off Transmission
In this subsection, we determine the joint optimal power al-
location ratio and secrecy rate pair (; Rs ) that maximizes
the EST of the on-off transmission scheme. Mathematically,
(; Rs ), is determined by
(; Rs ) = argmax
Rs; 0<1
T (; Rs) ; (27)
where  denotes the optimal power allocation ratio that
minimizes the hybrid outage probability Pho (;Rs) in (18)
(or equivalently, maximizes the secure transmission probability
Pst (;Rs) in (20)) for a given Rs. Mathematically,  is
determined by
 = argmin
0<1
Pho (;Rs) : (28)
We note that  is a function of Rs. By numerically taking
the second derivative of Pho (;Rs) with respect to  for a
given Rs, we find that @2Pho (;Rs) =@2 > 0 when 0 <  
1. This indicates that the optimal value of  that minimizes
Pho (;Rs) is unique. We note that a closed-form solution
for  is mathematically intractable, due to the complexity
of (18). As such, we resort to exhaustive search in order to
find the local optimal  between 0 and 1 and denote it as .
Using , we define the optimal hybrid outage probability and
the optimal secure transmission probability for a given Rs as
P ho (
; Rs) and P st (
; Rs), respectively. Accordingly, we
obtain the EST achieved by  is written as T (; Rs) =
RsP

st (
; Rs).
Due to the fact that P st (
; Rs) is maximized by , we
find that T (; Rs) is maximized by  since T (; Rs)
is a product of Rs and P st (
; Rs). We then take the first
derivative of T (; Rs) with respect to Rs for a given 
and find that @T (; Rs) =@Rs is first positive then negative
with increasing Rs. This implies that the optimal value of
Rs maximizing T (; Rs) is unique. The uniqueness of the
optimal Rs is not surprising since P st (
; Rs) decreases as Rs
increases. Therefore, there is absolutely an optimal Rs maxi-
mizing T (; Rs). Substituting T (; Rs) = RsP st (
; Rs)
into (27), we are able to solve the optimization problem in
(27) numerically. Specifically, we numerically find the value
of Rs maximizing T (; Rs) and define it as Rs . The value
of  for Rs is chosen as 
. We define the maximum EST
achieved by Rs and 
 as T  , T (; Rs ).
IV. ADAPTIVE TRANSMISSION
In this section, we focus on the adaptive transmission
scheme and examine its secrecy performance in the MISO
wiretap channel. First, we introduce the principle of the gen-
eral adaptive scheme. Second, we derive closed-form expres-
sions for the secrecy outage probability which is distinct from
(14) and the secure transmission probability which is distinct
from (20). Using these expressions, the EST, the probability of
non-zero secrecy capacity, and the "-outage secrecy capacity
are obtained. In order to optimize the secrecy performance,
we first determine the optimal power allocation ratio y that
minimizes the secrecy outage probability. Then we determine
the joint optimal pair
 
y; Rys

that maximizes the EST.
A. Principle of Adaptive Transmission
In the general adaptive transmission scheme, Alice selects
a flexible power allocation ratio  and a flexible code rate
Rs for each transmission period. In this scheme, Alice sets
Rb = Cb and Rs = Cb   C 0e and determines the values
of  and Rs based on ~b and e. The range of Rs is
0 < Rs < ~Cb, where ~Cb = log2 (1 + ~b), and the range
of  is
 
2Rs   1 =~b <   1. We note that transmission
outage occurs in the on-off transmission scheme but does not
occur in the adaptive transmission scheme, since the value of
Rs is chosen to be lower than Cb. As such, wiretap codes
can always be constructed based on Cb and Rs and Alice
always transmits. We also note that the values of  and Rs
depend upon the realization of the main channel. It follows
that once the main channel realization changes, the values of
 and Rs change accordingly. The optimal values of  and Rs
will be discussed in Section IV-C. We next define two mutually
exclusive events which partition the entire event space of this
scheme.
Event 1: Secrecy outage
This event occurs when Cs < Rs. In this case, the
assumed capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel is
lower than the actual capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel, i.e., C 0e < Ce. Therefore, secrecy is com-
promised.
Event 2: Secure transmission
This event occurs when Cs  Rs. In this case, the
assumed capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel is
better than the actual capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel, i.e., C 0e  Ce. Therefore, the code guaran-
tees perfect secrecy.
We clarify that in the adaptive transmission scheme, Alice
always transmits, which is due to two reasons. First, the
wiretap codes can be constructed using Cb and Rs. Second,
it is improbable that the instantaneous capacity of the main
channel is zero. This fact indicates that the transmission outage
probability is zero. Therefore, we examine two probabilities:
i) the secrecy outage probability which is defined as the prob-
ability of Event 1 and ii) the secure transmission probability
which is defined as the probability of Event 2. Note that these
two probabilities are conditional probabilities for a given ~b.
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B. Secrecy Performance of Adaptive Transmission
1) Secrecy outage probability: The secrecy outage proba-
bility is defined as
Pso (;Rsj~b) = Pr (Ce > Cb  Rsj~b)
= Pr (log2 (1 + e) > log2 (1 + b) Rsj~b) : (29)
Using (9), we derive the secrecy outage probability as
Pso (;Rsj~b) = 1  Fe

2log2(1+~b) Rs   1

=

1 +
(1  )  ()
 (N   1)
 (N 1)
e 
()
e ; (30)
where  () = 2 Rs (1 + ~b)  1.
2) Secure transmission probability: We note that the hybrid
outage probability of the adaptive transmission scheme is equal
to the secrecy outage probability in (30) since the transmission
outage probability is zero. Therefore, the secure transmission
probability is obtained as
Pst (;Rsj~b) = 1  Pso (;Rsj~b) : (31)
We highlight that (30) and (31) are valid for
 
2Rs   1 =~b <
  1. Moreover, we clarify that (30) is different from [30,
Eq. (8)] since [30, Eq. (8)] considered zero noise at Eve while
(30) considers an arbitrary noise power at Eve.
3) Effective secrecy throughput: We now examine the EST.
Utilizing (31), the EST is formulated as
T (;Rsj~b) = RsPst (;Rsj~b) : (32)
Since Pst (;Rsj~b) is a function of , N , ~b, and e, (32)
indicates that T (;Rsj~b) is jointly determined by  and Rs
for given N , ~b, and e.
4) Other performance metrics: First, we derive the proba-
bility of non-zero secrecy rate as
Pnz (j~b) =1  Pso (;Rsj~b) jRs=0
=1 

1 +
(1  ) ~b
N   1
 (N 1)
e 
~b
e : (33)
Second, we obtain the "-outage secrecy rate as
C (; "j~b) = max
Rs:Pso(;Rsj~b)"
Rs: (34)
Substituting (30) into (34), the "-outage secrecy rate can be
obtained via numerical root-finding.
C. Performance Optimization of Adaptive Transmission
In this subsection, we determine the joint optimal power
allocation ratio and secrecy rate pair
 
y; Rys

in order to
maximize the EST of the adaptive scheme for a given ~b.
Such an optimization problem is formulated as 
y; Rys

= argmax
0<Rs<Cb;
2Rs 1
~b
<y1
T
 
y; Rsj~b

; (35)
where y denotes the optimal power allocation ratio that min-
imizes the secrecy outage probability Pso (;Rsj~b) in (30)
(or equivalently, maximizes the secure transmission probability
Pst (;Rsj~b) in (31)) for given ~b and Rs.
In order to solve (35), we first find y for a given Rs via
y = argmin
2Rs 1
~b
<1
Pso (;Rsj~b) : (36)
We numerically confirm the uniqueness of the opti-
mal  that minimizes Pso (;Rsj~b) by finding that
@2Pso (;Rsj~b) =@2 > 0 for
 
2Rs   1 =~b <   1.
Setting the first order derivative of Pso (;Rsj~b) to zero
and performing mathematical operations, we obtain a cubic
equation given by
1
3 + 2
2 + 3+ 4 = 0; (37)
where 1 = 2Rs (N   1) ~be, 2 =
 
2Rs   1 ~b, 3 =
   2Rs   1 ~b   1  2Rse + 2RsN (e + 1), and 4 = 
2Rs   12. With the aid of the Cardano’s formula [29], we
find the root of (37) as
i =   1
31

2 + i+
0
i

; (38)
where i 2 f1; 2; 3g, i are the three cube roots of unity given
by 1 = 1, 2 = 12
  1 +p 3, and 3 = 12   1 p 3,
and  is given by
 =

1
2

1 +
q
21   430
 1
3
; (39)
with 0 = 22   313 and 1 = 232   9123 + 27214.
In order to compute y in the desired range ( 2
Rs 1
~b
; 1] that
minimizes Pso (;Rsj~b), we compare the values of the cost
function Pso (;Rsj~b) at the extreme point3  = 1 and at
 = i for i 2 f1; 2; 3g if i 2 ( 2Rs 1~b ; 1]. The value of
 that achieves the minimum Pso (;Rsj~b) is chosen as y.
Accordingly, we define the optimal secrecy outage probability
and the optimal secure transmission probability with y for
given ~b and Rs as P
y
so
 
y; Rsj~b

and P yst
 
y; Rsj~b

,
respectively. We further define the EST achieved by y as
T
 
y; Rsj~b

= RsP
y
st
 
y; Rsj~b

.
We confirm that the optimal value of  maximiz-
ing T
 
y; Rsj~b

is unique, based on the definition of
T
 
y; Rsj~b

. We then confirm that the optimal value of
Rs maximizing T
 
y; Rsj~b

is unique by finding that
@T
 
y; Rsj~b

=@Rs is first positive then negative as Rs
increases. After obtaining T
 
y; Rsj~b

, we can numerically
find the value of Rs maximizing T y
 
y; Rsj~b

, which is
defined as Rys . Accordingly, the value of 
y for Rys is chosen
as y. The maximum EST achieved by Rys and 
y is
defined as T y (~b) , T
 
y; Rys j~b

. Finally, we obtain the
maximum average EST of the adaptive transmission scheme
as
T y = E~b

T y (~b)

; (40)
which takes expectation of T y (~b) over ~b.
3Here, we do not examine  = 2
Rs 1
~b
. This is due to the fact that
when  = 2
Rs 1
~b
, we find that Cb = Rs and thus Pso (;Rsj~b) =
Pr (Ce > 0j~b) = 1.
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V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to examine the
impact of the number of transmit antennas, N , and the SNRs
of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel on the
secrecy performance. We also compare the performance of the
AN transmission schemes with the following schemes: 1) the
transmit BF schemes [15] where maximal ratio transmission
[34] is adopted at Alice and 2) the NAE and AE schemes [30].
A. On-Off Transmission
In this subsection, we examine the performance of the on-
off AN transmission scheme. We first examine the impact
of N , b, and e on the EST of the on-off transmission
scheme. In Figs. 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c), we compare the EST
achieved by the on-off AN transmission scheme with  to
that achieved by the on-off transmit BF scheme versus Rs.
In these figures, the EST achieved by the on-off transmit BF
scheme is obtained as TBF = RsP
(2)
s (Rs). We find from these
figures that the maximum EST achieved by the on-off AN
transmission scheme with  is higher than that achieved by
the on-off transmit BF scheme.
1) Impact of N and b: We first examine the impact of the
network parameters that can be controlled at Alice, namely N
and b, on the EST. Fig. 2(a) examines the impact of N and
Fig. 2(b) examines the impact of b. In these figures, we first
see that the EST increases when N or b increases. We also
see that the value of Rs that maximizes the EST shifts to
the right when N or b increases. This reveals that Alice is
able to use a higher secure transmission rate if she possesses a
larger number of antennas or she uses a higher transmit power.
We further confirm that the value of  that maximizes the
EST decreases when N or b increases. For example, 

decreases from 0.79 to 0.72 when N increases from 2 to 4,
and  decreases from 0.75 to 0.47 when b increases from
10 dB to 20 dB. This reveals that Alice allocates more power
to the AN signal to achieve the maximum EST for larger N
and higher b in the on-off transmission scheme.
2) Impact of e: Fig. 2(c) examines the impact of the
network parameter that cannot be controlled at Alice, e, on
the EST. In this figure, we consider a fixed b = 20 dB
such that e increases when b=e decreases. We first see that
the EST decreases when e increases. We also see that R

s
shifts to the left when e increases. This reveals that Alice
can only use a lower secure transmission rate if the quality
of the eavesdropper’s channel becomes higher. Furthermore,
it is confirmed that the value of  that maximizes the EST
decreases when e increases. For example, 
 decreases from
0.54 to 0.47 when e increases from b=15 to b=5. This
reveals that Alice allocates more power to the AN signal
to achieve the maximum EST for higher e in the on-off
transmission scheme.
We now compare the maximum EST of the on-off transmis-
sion scheme, T , with the EST of the NAE scheme, T NAE,
versus b in Fig. 3. Here, we define T

NAE as T

NAE = (1  
)NAE, where 

NAE is the maximum throughput given by [30,
Eq. (18)] and  is the conditional secrecy outage probability.
Here, we consider  = 0:1 and  = 0:01. We observe that
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(a) EST comparison for b = 10 dB, b=e = 5, and different
values of N .
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(c) EST comparison for N = 3, b = 20 dB, and different values
of b=e.
Fig. 2. EST comparison of the on-off transmission scheme: Artificial noise
with  versus BF.
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Fig. 3. Maximum EST comparison between the on-off transmission scheme
and the NAE scheme for N = 4 and e = 5 dB.
the on-off transmission scheme provides a higher EST than
the NAE scheme across the whole range of b. In particular,
the EST advantage of the on-off transmission scheme over the
NAE scheme becomes higher when  becomes lower. For the
sake of a fair comparison, we examine the conditional secrecy
outage probability of the on-off transmission scheme when the
maximum EST is achieved, which is defined as
on-off , Pso (; Rs jCb  Rs ) =
Pso (
; Rs )
Pt (; Rs )
: (41)
We find that on-off decreases when b increases. For example,
we find that on-off = 0:101 when b = 20 dB and on-off =
0:063 when b = 30 dB. This fact implies that the on-off
transmission scheme offers a higher EST, while incurring a
lower conditional secrecy outage probability than the NAE
scheme with  = 0:1 in the high SNR regime, e.g., b > 20
dB. In the low SNR regime, the on-off transmission scheme
offers a higher EST at the cost of incurring a higher conditional
secrecy outage probability than the NAE scheme. As such, the
on-off transmission scheme trades off the secrecy outage with
a higher EST.
We now plot T  versus on-off and plot T NAE versus  in
Fig. 4. In this figure, we clarify that T  and on-off do not
change for given N , b, and e. We first see that T
 is
higher than T NAE achieved at  = on-off. For example, when
b = 20 dB, we find that T
   T NAE = 1:19 bps/Hz at
 = on-off = 0:132. Second, we see that there exists a unique
 that maximizes T NAE, which is denoted as 

NAE. We find that
T  is higher than the maximum T NAE. Notably, we also see
that on-off is slightly smaller than NAE. For example, we find
that on-off = 0:132 and NAE = 0:154 when b = 20 dB. This
fact demonstrates that the on-off transmission scheme provides
a higher EST while maintaining a lower conditional secrecy
outage probability than the NAE scheme. Therefore, the on-off
transmission scheme is more promising than the NAE scheme
for practical applications from the EST perspective.
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Fig. 4. Maximum EST comparison between the on-off transmission scheme
and the NAE scheme for N = 3 and e = 10 dB.
TABLE I
THE VALUES OF y AND Rys FOR T y (~b) WHEN N = 3
e = 5 dB e = 10 dB
~b (dB) y R
y
s 
y Rys
0 0.608 0.35 0.516 0.31
5 0.583 0.83 0.489 0.74
10 0.564 1.68 0.465 1.52
15 0.548 2.86 0.442 2.63
20 0.531 4.24 0.421 3.96
B. Adaptive Transmission
In this subsection, we examine the performance of the
adaptive AN transmission scheme. In Fig. 5, we compare
the maximum EST achieved by the adaptive AN trans-
mission scheme to that achieved by the adaptive transmit
BF scheme versus ~b. In this figure, the maximum EST
achieved by the adaptive transmit BF scheme is obtained as
T yBF = maxRs TBF (Rsj~b), where TBF (Rsj~b) denotes the
EST achieved by the adaptive transmit BF scheme, given by
TBF (Rsj~b) = Rs

1  e 
2 Rs (1+~b) 1
e

: (42)
We see that the maximum EST increases when ~b increases but
decreases when e increases. We also see that the maximum
EST achieved by the adaptive AN transmission scheme is
higher than that achieved by the adaptive transmit BF scheme.
Notably, the maximum EST advantage of AN over BF in-
creases with ~b for a given e. Furthermore, the maximum
EST advantage of AN over BF increases with e for a
given ~b. These observations indicate that the adaptive AN
transmission scheme brings a more profound throughput gain
relative to the adaptive transmit BF scheme when either ~b or
e increases.
We next examine the impact of ~b and e on the values
of y and Rys to offer practical insights into system design.
Table I lists the values of y and Rys that achieve T
y (~b).
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Fig. 5. Maximum EST comparison of the adaptive transmission scheme:
Artificial noise with y and Rys versus BF for N = 3.
In this table we see that the value of y decreases as ~b
increases, which indicates that Alice allocates more power
to the AN signal to achieve the maximum EST for higher
~b in the adaptive transmission scheme. This observation is
due to the fact that when the quality of the main channel
becomes higher, e.g., Bob is located closer to Alice, Alice
does not need as much power to transmit information signals.
As such, Alice allocates more power to AN signals so as to
confuse Eve. Intuitively, allocating more power to AN signals
decreases the SINR at Eve, and thus potentially improves
the EST. We also see that the value of y decreases as e
increases, which indicates that Alice allocates more power to
the AN signal to achieve the maximum EST for higher e in
the adaptive transmission scheme. This observation is due to
the fact that when the quality of the eavesdropper’s channel
becomes higher, e.g., Eve is located closer to Alice, Alice
needs to use a larger amount of power to confuse Eve. We
further see that the value of Rys increases as ~b increases.
Additionally, we see that the value of Rys decreases as e
increases. These observations indicate that Alice supports a
larger optimal secrecy rate for higher ~b but a smaller optimal
secrecy rate for higher e in the adaptive transmission scheme.
We now compare the maximum average EST of the adaptive
transmission scheme, T y, with the average EST of the AE
scheme, T AE, versus b in Fig. 6. Here, T

AE is defined as
T AE = (1   )AE, where AE is the maximum average
throughput given by [30, Eq. (33)]. Two values of  are
considered in this figure, namely  = 0:1 and  = 0:01. It is
evident that the adaptive transmission scheme offers a higher
average EST than the AE scheme, regardless of the value of
. For a smaller , a larger EST advantage of the adaptive
transmission scheme over the AE scheme is achieved. Similar
to Fig. 3, we examine the secrecy outage probability of the
adaptive transmission scheme associated with the maximum
average EST, defined as adap , E~b

Pso
 
y; Rys j~b

. It is
found that adap decreases as b increases. For example, we
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Fig. 6. Maximum average EST comparison between the adaptive transmis-
sion scheme and the AE scheme for N = 4 and e = 5 dB.
find that adap = 0:066 when b = 20 dB and adap = 0:039
when b = 30 dB. Compared to the AE scheme with  = 0:01,
the adaptive transmission scheme trades off the secrecy outage
with a higher EST.
In Fig. 7, we plot T y versus adap and plot T AE versus
. We first see that T y is higher than T AE at  = adap.
We also see that T y is higher than the maximum T AE. We
further see that adap is slightly smaller than AE. These two
observations indicate that the adaptive transmission scheme
offers a higher EST while incurring a lower conditional
secrecy outage probability than the AE scheme. As such, the
adaptive transmission scheme is more suitable to be applied
than the AE scheme if the EST maximization is the design
target.
C. On-Off Transmission versus Adaptive Transmission
We finally compare the throughput performance between
the on-off transmission scheme and the adaptive transmission
scheme. In Fig. 8, we plot the maximum EST of the on-
off transmission scheme and the maximum average EST of
the adaptive transmission scheme versus b. We see that the
adaptive transmission scheme achieves a higher EST than
the on-off transmission scheme. This observation is due to
the fact that the adaptive transmission scheme optimizes 
and Rs during each transmission period while the on-off
transmission scheme optimizes  and Rs only once and uses
the optimized  and Rs for all the transmission periods.
Of course, we note that the EST advantage of the adaptive
transmission scheme over the on-off transmission scheme is
not pronounced. Moreover, we see that T  and T y increase
as b increases and N increases. Furthermore, we see that
T  and T y decrease as e increases. These observations are
consistent with the expectation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed two transmission schemes using AN that
maximize the EST in MISO wiretap channels with a passive
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adaptive transmission T y(Rys ).
eavesdropper. For the on-off transmission scheme, the optimal
solutions were constructed based on our easy-to-compute
and channel-independent expression for the hybrid outage
probability. For the adaptive transmission scheme, the optimal
solutions were constructed based on our new closed-form
expression for the secrecy outage probability. Based on these
expressions, we determined the joint optimal power allocation
ratio and secrecy rate in order to achieve the maximum EST.
Numerical results were presented to characterize the impact of
N and SNRs on the secrecy performance, the optimal power
allocation, and the optimal secrecy rate.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on the properties of the statistics of b and e, we
first express (13) as
Pso (;Rs) =
Z 1
0
Z 2Rs (1+e) 1
2Rs 1
fb (b) fe (e) dbde
=
Z 1
0
fe (e)Fb
 
2Rs (1 + e)  1

de| {z }
`1
 
Z 1
0
fe (e)Fb
 
2Rs   1 de| {z }
`2
: (43)
Differentiating Fe () with respect to , we obtain the proba-
bility density function of e, fe (). Substituting fe () and
(8) into (43), we derive `1 as
`1 =1  e 
2RS 1
b
N 1X
n=0
 
2RS   1n
n! (b)
n
nX
m=0

n
m

2RS
2RS   1
m


1
e
~1 +
1  

~2

; (44)
where
~1 =
Z 1
0
e
 

2RS
b
+ 1e

e
 me

1 +
(1  ) e
 (N   1)
 (N 1)
de
(45)
and
~2 =
Z 1
0
e
 

2RS
b
+ 1e

e
 me

1 +
(1  ) e
 (N   1)
 N
de:
(46)
When 0 <  < 1, we use [35, Eq. (9.211.4)] to solve the
integrals ~1 and ~2 in closed form. Specifically, we change
the variable t = (1 )e(N 1) in ~1 and derive it as
~1 = m+1
Z 1
0
e t
tm
(1 + t)
N 1 dt
= m+1  (m+ 1)U (m+ 1; N +m+ 3; ) : (47)
where  and  are defined in (15). We then derive ~2 as
~2 = m+1
Z 1
0
e t
tm
(1 + t)
N
dt
= m+1  (m+ 1)U (m+ 1; N +m+ 2; ) : (48)
When  = 1, we simplify ~1 and ~2 as ~1 = ~2 = ~3 and
derive ~3 using [35, Eq. (3.381.4)] as
~3 =
Z 1
0
e
 

2RS
b
+ 1e

eme de
=   (m+ 1)

2RS
b
+
1
e
 (m+1)
: (49)
We further derive `2 in (43) as
`2 = 1  Fb
 
2Rs   1
= 1  e  2
Rs 1
b
N 1X
n=0
1
n!

2Rs 1
b
n
: (50)
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Therefore, the secrecy outage probability for 0 <  < 1
in (15) is obtained by substituting ~1, ~2, and `2 into (43).
Moreover, the secrecy outage probability for  = 1 in (16) is
obtained by substituting ~3 and `2 into (43). This completes
the proof.
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